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1. Introduction
In modern societies, where computing technologies are applied
in nearly every aspect of everyday life, from door locks and
watches, to security systems and trafﬁc lights, to cars, trains,
airplanes and space vehicles, there is a need to protect ourselves
against unexpected and undesirable behaviors of computer based
systems. Such need led to the introduction of computer safety
standards developed by professional organizations and enforced
by government regulations. These standards can be roughly
divided into two categories: those relevant to hardware and those
relevant to software.
The introduction of such standards started relatively early in
the domain of aviation, because of the unusual vulnerability of the
society facing aircraft related accidents potentially caused by
computer failures, and the corresponding urgent need of devel-
oping protective measures. In this view, the U.S. government and
international agencies that regulate respective industries have
issued and promoted a number of standards and guidelines, related
to certiﬁcation and/or other aspects of software assurance, such as
qualiﬁcation, licensing or validation, in their speciﬁc areas of
interest. Especially important is guidance related to civil aviation
and airborne systems: DO-178B in the U.S. and its European
counterpart EUROCAE ED-12B (RTCA, 1992), and DO-254 in the
U.S. and its equivalent EUROCAE ED-80 (RTCA, 2000).
In general, an exhaustive discussion of safety issues related to
certiﬁcation of digital hardware should include three types of
technologies used in contemporary designs: microprocessors,
programmable logic devices (PLDs), and hardware design lan-
guages (HDLs). A thorough discussion of safety aspects of using
microprocessors in such systems has been published recently by
Mahapatra et al. (2006–2009). Thus in this paper, we only deal
with selected aspects of certiﬁcation of microprocessor-based
systems.
Furthermore, although HDLs are extensively used in electronic
design automation, both for microprocessors and PLDs, an
extensive study on safety aspects of using HDLs and their
certiﬁcation is still to be written. General software aspects of
certiﬁcation have been covered in separate papers (Kornecki &
Zalewski, 2008; Kornecki & Zalewski, 2009).
Consequently, the focus of the current paper is on certiﬁcation
of PLDs. We discuss issues related to hardware related standard,
DO-254, and respective hardware aspects of airborne systems’
certiﬁcation. The paper is structured as follows. The next two
sections discuss issues related to circuits’ compliancewith DO-254
in avionics and other industries, respectively. Section 4 outlines a
more formal approach to certiﬁcation and Section 5 presents some
views on and experiences with software tools qualiﬁcation against
DO-254. Some results of a study on tool qualiﬁcation are presented
in Section 6, and the summary in Section 7.
2. Circuits’ compliance with DO-254
With the progress ofmicro-electronic technologies, the avionics
hardware is typically custom generated using, as components,
programmable logic devices. Field-Programmable Logic Arrays
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(FPGA) and Application Speciﬁc Integrated Circuits (ASIC) are two
leading implementation technologies. More often the devices
include also components containing Intellectual Property (IP)
chips with dedicated algorithms or custom made solutions
resembling general purpose embeddedmicroprocessor’s function-
ality. All this caused an emergence of RTCA document DO-254
(RTCA, 2000), which deals with safety assurance for hardware used
in avionics and can be applied to other safety-critical systems.
What also contributed to the origins of DO-254 is the fact that
avionics companies and designers, facing the rigors of DO-178B
guidance, began moving system functionality from software to
hardware (Hilderman & Baghai, 2003). As reported by Cole & Beeby
(2004), ‘‘There are several schemes that have been used by some to
take advantage of a current loophole that allows airborne software
functionality to be embedded in ﬁrmware or programmable
devices. This loophole affectively sidesteps the need to adhere to
DO-178B as a software standard.’’ Thus, a new document was
introduced that forms the basis for certiﬁcation of complex
electronic hardware, by identifying design lifecycle process,
characterizing the objectives, and offering means of complying
with certiﬁcation requirements. The Advisory Circular published
subsequently by the FAA (2005) clariﬁes the applicability of DO-
254 to custom micro-coded components, such as ASIC, PLD, FPGA,
and similar.
Our previous papers (Kornecki and Zalewski, 2008, 2009)
reported on some of these issues. In the section below, we are
discussing some additional papers inmore detail, review a number
of most recent approaches to hardware certiﬁcation according to
DO-254, and cover other important points from the literature.
2.1. General issues of DO-254 certiﬁcation
Miner et al. (2000) were probably the ﬁrst to consider
compliance with DO-254, before even the standard was ofﬁcially
released. In a joint project with the FAA, NASA Langley was
developing a hardware design to gain understanding of the
guidance document and generate an example suitable for training.
A core subsystem of the Scalable Processor-Independent Design for
Electromagnetic Resilience (SPIDER) was selected for this case
study.
Hilderman and Baghai (2003) offered an advice to manufac-
turers tomap their existing development processes to those of DO-
254. At the strategic level, the recommend approach is ‘‘to focus on
ensuring correctness at the conceptual design stage and then
preserve the design integrity’’ as one proceeds through the detailed
design and implementation. However, each individual vendor or
designer faces multiple speciﬁc design problems that must be
addressed to meet the DO-254 objectives. How they proceed
depends on an individual vendor and the type of problem.
Young (2004) reported on the role commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) products could have in safety-critical avionics systems
creation under DO-254 guidance. The APMC (Avionics Process
Management Committee) has produced EIA-933 Standard for
Preparing a COTS Assembly Management Plan. This document
recommends how to select and manage suppliers of avionics COTS
products.
In the white paper of the DO-254 Users Group, Baghai &
Burgaud (2004) offered a package including the following ﬁve
items designed to assist in the qualiﬁcation process:
 The process documents, that help deﬁne, benchmark and
improve the industrial design, veriﬁcation, validation, and
quality assurance processes.
 The quality assurance checklists, for reviews and audits, ensuring
that each project is compliant with the deﬁned industrial
process.
 The tools for requirements’ management and traceability,
checking compliance of HDL code with coding standards, HDL
code veriﬁcation, and test suite optimization.
 The tools integration into the industrial process, supporting their
qualiﬁcation (interfaces, report generation for a certiﬁcation
audit, trainings, tools assessment, etc.).
 The DO-254 training by consulting partners.
Cole and Beeby (2004) studied DO-254 compliance for graphic
processors, considered as COTS components, and proposed a four-
phase approach to meet DO-254 objectives:
(1) Provision of a DO-254 COTS data pack to support the use of a
given electronic part.
(2) Provision of a DO-254 compliance statement.
(3) Process improvement and further analysis.
(4) Ongoing support for new parts and processes.
For a part that was already fully designed and in production (as
Phase 1 above), only the following could be done for compliance:
 Review of the available component management data from chip
designer and chip manufacturer.
 Analysis of the available data for completeness.
 Augmentation of the available data through further analysis and
testing, in case of any existing deﬁciencies.
 Developing recommendations to improve the process for future
parts.
 Development of the COTS data pack in a format compatible with
DO-254.
 Revising the data pack with DER to ensure completeness and
suitability for DO-254 submission by end customers.
Phase 2 is meant to take a closer look at the design and
development processes, without changing them. Rather, it
provides the foundation for improving these processes and
obtaining better compliance with DO-254. Phase 3 is a step to
put the recommendations of Phase 2 into practice. Finally, the role
of Phase 4 is to provide the continuous process of DO-254
compliance for making any new parts that might need such
compliance.
Glazebrook (2007) discussed certiﬁcation according to DO-254
in the British aviation industry, focusing on the 26 data items listed
in the standard as the compliance suite, of which four are required
for submission: (a) plan for hardware aspects of certiﬁcation; (b)
hardware veriﬁcation plan; (c) top level drawings; and (d)
hardware accomplishment summary. He made several recom-
mendations summarized below:
 Developing robust and accurate plan early in the program before
transition to the development stages of the lifecycle is essential.
 Using prooﬁng and obsolescence robustness assessments as part
of the component selection process.
 Focusing on proven techniques and approaches.
 Ensuring that robust and controlled transition criteria are
implemented prior to any development.
 Ensuring that the requirements are controlled and sufﬁciently
abstracted in the inception phase.
 Using traceability metrics from the project inception.
 Considering veriﬁcation at the start of the program.
 Detecting and eliminating coding errors should be seen as part of
the development activity.
Lee (2007) analyzes the British aviation authority views on
procurement and acceptance of military avionic systems based on
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the continuing technical advances in electronic system design, and
in particular the capabilities of Programmable Logic Devices
(PLDs). An interpretation of the DO-254 from the perspective of
military systems identiﬁes several issues in DO-254 compliant
development and certiﬁcation, such as:
 Inadequate level of detail in requirements.
 Inadequate formal planning and following of plans.
 Lack of independence in quality assurance and veriﬁcation.
 Inadequate and non-automated traceability.
 Lack of automatic testing.
Two papers from Barco-Siles S.A. (Pampagnin & Menis, 2007
and Leroy & Bezamat, 2007) report on the way the company
deals with increasing demands on the hardware development
processes resulting from DO-254 conformance. In the former
paper, the authors state that even though implementing DO-254
has necessarily a non-negligible cost, this can be considered as
an investment. It obliges the supplier to analyze in detail their
processes, methodologies and tools and to apply a structured
development processes, with a rigorous quality assurance. It
also allows the supplier to adapt deﬁned set of internal
processes to the design assurance level targeted to optimize
efforts. The resulted products have a better quality and the
development cycles are optimized. Veriﬁcation is focused on
design errors, and effort and resources are better distributed. It
obliges the subcontractor to respect a structured development
processes. The initial cost has to be compared with the level of
quality for the subcontractor. Applying the DO-254 gives the
assurance that the applicant can obtain from its subcontractor a
good level of quality, good documentation, and the ability to
reuse the design, if necessary.
The latter paper deals speciﬁcally with the way how Barco-
Silex has applied theDO-254 guidance for designing FPGAcircuits.
It addresses the development cost impact on FPGA design
throughout the veriﬁcation level and the amount of data delivered
in this process. The golden rule to provide hardware design
assurance for any design entity is that the three fundamentals
design phases, Speciﬁcation, conception and validation, must be
performed by different people in order to avoid error propagation
over the lifecycle. Inmany cases, validation resultsmay need to be
reviewed independently to conﬁrm proper procedures were
followed and that the results conﬁrm that the requirements have
been met.
Plastow (2007) considers DO-254 compliance from the
perspective of space applications, and argues that: ‘‘Hardware
development follows a process that is very similar to software
development. Many of the proven software techniques used in
software development/veriﬁcation can be used with little or no
modiﬁcation on hardware.’’ Thus, he recommends using software
techniques, such as change impact analysis and fault tree analysis
to provide a way to better understand and verify a complex
electronics design. As he states, such interdisciplinary approach
would insure better design quality.
More recently, the British Avionics Systems Standardisation
Committee issued an ofﬁcial guidance (as an extension of (Lee,
2007)) based on DO-254, aimed at the assurance of PLDs
implemented on a single integrated circuit (ASSC, 2009). It is
interesting to note some of the assumptions that were mentioned
as a rationale for issuing this document:
 There continues to be an exponential growth in the use of PLDs in
all industrial sectors including military aerospace.
 PLDs have particular advantages over microprocessor-based
systems in terms of processing power, I/O capacity, reduced
footprint and a reduction in number of ICs on the circuit board.
 The DO-254 guidance has been given increased prominence in
the civil aerospace sector by the FAA Advisory Circular (FAA,
2005) and is becoming a ‘‘de facto’’ standard.
2.2. Response from chip manufacturers and EDA industry
Chip and board manufacturers are particularly eager to comply
with DO-254, because of their concerns about the market share. So
is the entire Electronic Design Automation (EDA) industry, whose
design tools and processes undergo an additional scrutiny. Since
compliance with DO-254 guidance is considered a technological
advantage, most of the vendors began changing their development
processes towards meeting the guidance objectives. Several
companies announced their readiness to comply with certiﬁcation
requirements.
Mentor Graphics and Aldec/Actel seem to take the lead in
providing compliance of their products with DO-254. While some
of respective papers have been reviewed in Kornecki and Zalewski
(2009), here we provide some additional insight.
Dewey (2008) outlines the contents of the standard and
comments on the meaning of its requirements to the vendors and
suppliers, especially on added costs. He focuses on the properties of
data (artifacts) generated throughout the design process and lists
the six characteristics, as per DO-254:
 Non-ambiguity, i.e., having a single interpretation.
 Completeness, i.e., inclusion of all requirements along with the
associated data.
 Veriﬁability, i.e., existence of means to determine that data are
correct.
 Consistency, i.e., avoidance of conﬂicts among data.
 Modiﬁability, i.e., no need to change the structure of data.
 Traceability, i.e., ability to determine the origin of data.
Regarding the tool qualiﬁcation, he states what the standard
does, that:
 Tools generating code have more rigorous qualiﬁcation process
than tools that verify results.
 Each version of a tool has to be qualiﬁed in the context of
particular projects.
Lange & Boer (2007) give an overview of functional hardware
veriﬁcationmethodologies, as a part of the design process, butwith
very little reference to DO-254, contrary to what the paper title
claims. Their important consideration, however, is that the
veriﬁcation techniques that served well the designs 10–15 years
ago are no longer adequate due to a tremendous increase in design
complexity and integration. As a consequence, design veriﬁcation
has become a limiting factor in safety-critical systems, especially
with respect to such factors as: complexity, concurrency and
metastability. Latest veriﬁcation techniques are then described
that take care of such issues as state explosion, design traceability
and effectiveness of coverage.
One of Mentor Graphics’ techniques, called Advanced Veriﬁca-
tion Methodology (AVM), consisting of constraint random test
generation, a total coveragemodel, design intent speciﬁcation, and
formal model checking, is described in (Keithan et al., 2008). It has
been used on a practical design of an FPGA based DMA engine at
Rockwell-Collins, with the DO-254 compliant project.
The use of AVM is an important consideration for a safety-
critical project, since it is based on an open source Transaction
Level Modeling (TLM) class library and supports standard
languages SystemVerilog and SystemC. As such, even though
originated at Mentor Graphics, it is vendor neutral. Due to its open
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source nature it allows code inspections that may be required for
certiﬁcation. Although the project has not been fully completed at
the time of this writing, it was believed that AVM helps not only
demonstrate that the requirements have been satisﬁed to the
highest possible level (the ultimate veriﬁcation goal off DO-254),
but also assists in shortening design cycles. Interestingly, the
requirements phase used a requirement capture tool DOORS,
which has been typically applied in software development
projects.
Lee & Dewey (2007) shed more light on meeting DO-254
objectives in a form acceptable to the auditor known as Designated
Engineering Representative (DER), by explicitly addressing its
subset:
 Requirements management and tracking, with the use of such
tools as Reqtify or DOORS.
 Register Transfer Level (RTL) code validation, with an automated
method to measure RTL to a company standard.
 Veriﬁcation process assurance, with the use of AVM.
 Producing design documentation, from requirements, to the RTL
code, to the bit streams or Graphic Data System (GDS) II ﬁle
format.
All this is written and outlined keeping in mind that ‘‘DO-254 is
not a burden but a set of guides that helps standardize hardware
systems assurance, making ﬂight systems safe.’’
Aldec and Actel, working in alliance, published information on
their efforts towards making their products DO-254 certiﬁable.
Sysenko and Pragasam (2007) outlined their process for airborne
systems design assurance which relies on the veriﬁcation
methodology called Hardware Embedded Simulation (HES), and
follows two traditional steps: RTL simulation and gate-level
simulation. It is a hardware–software simulation platform driven
by software that facilitates the implementation of the design in a
reconﬁgurable hardware, such as an FPGA, and then veriﬁcation of
the design functions. Zalewski (2007) described in more technical
detail (although without any references to DO-254) what seems to
be the core of such approach, with using a hardware accelerator,
which is essentially a hardware board and a simulator connected
via a high-speed interface with intelligent clock.
Further, Zalewski (2008) elaborates on Aldec’s DO-254 Com-
pliance Tool Set (CTS), developed to address several challenges
stemming from DO-254, including the following:
 Introducing inadvertent errors in functionality or timing during
the FPGA design process.
 Running the design in the target FPGA device at required
operational speed, and driving it with the same test cases an in
the traditional HDL simulation.
 Requirements traceability ensuring complete coverage with the
same set of test cases as in HDL simulation.
More information on the Aldec veriﬁcation methodology is
given in a White Paper (Aldec 2009). Its essential component is in-
hardware testing, which – if applied properly – provides the
following beneﬁts:
 Same number of tests can be run in the target device as I the HDL
simulator.
 Full design veriﬁcation in the target device can be made before
the system test.
 The veriﬁcation process runs at full speed driven by vectors
captured during HDL simulation.
Automatic documentation is generated and traceability is
assured back to the design requirements.
It is interesting to note that Aldec FPGA chips, as being used in
safety-critical applications, have undergone some signiﬁcant
scrutiny. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) per-
formed thorough evaluation tests on Actel A54SX-A/RTSX-SU
FPGAs used on satellites (Sakaide et al., 2005). In particular, the
operational life tests, the temperature cycling tests, and the
radiation tests were performed to collect the reliability data and
assess the risk of using these products on the ﬂight units. However,
the results were meant to be applicable only to this particular
project and no reference to DO-254 was made.
Lundquist (2007) in his thesis looked in more details at the
problems that arise when trying to certify system-on-chip
solutions with DO-254 compliance. Used as an example of an
embedded FPGA, the Actel Fusion FPGA chip with integrated
analog and digital functionality is tested according to the
veriﬁcation guidance. The thesis shows that a certiﬁcation
procedure for a standard non-embedded FPGA based safety-
critical system is possible. As the author states, if similar solutions
could be used in the aviation industry it would mean using fewer
systems that could do more, thereby among other things reducing
system complexity and development costs. However, the question
of how these embedded chips could pass certiﬁcation to be used in
safety-critical systems remains unanswered in this thesis.
Vendors and manufacturers continue their efforts to, ﬁrst,
understand the need for DO-254 compliance, and then meet the
standard’s requirements. Recently, Reeve & Lange (2008) pub-
lished a white paper discussing concerns of creating and executing
the DO-254 compliant design project. Among the potential pitfalls
that need to be addressed they list the following:
 Do not think that you can ‘‘get around’’ DO-254.
 Do not attempt to generate DO-254 documents after the fact.
 Engage in a DO-254 program with proper preparation.
 Be prepared that requirements traceability is a reactive process.
 Consider reusing current designs.
 Understand that tool qualiﬁcation is difﬁcult.
Altera in a White Paper on DO-254 support for FPGA design
process (Altera Corporation, 2008) focuses on the cost risks and
assuring proper partnerships tomitigate costs. Prospective partner
roles in certiﬁcation are listed as: providing veriﬁcation tools,
education and process support, involving independent IP suppliers,
and obtaining certiﬁcation services.
In another recent paper from Altera, Kenny (2008) states that
‘‘DO-254 compliance requires an ecosystem of partners that offers
a range of DO-254 certiﬁable solutions.’’ Further, the paper
discusses the intricacies of DO-254 and emphasizes importance
of dealing with several components of this ecosystem, such as:
 Planning and educational support.
 Veriﬁcation methods and tools qualiﬁcation.
 Certiﬁcation services.
 Programmable logic and IP suppliers.
Xilinx in their White Paper (Le Mauff & Elliott, 2009) gives an
interesting interpretation of DO-254, stating that ‘‘for FPGA design
certiﬁcation, the user has to demonstrate design assurance of both
the design and the design process.’’ Additionally, two speciﬁc
aspects arementioned to achieve design reliability: device-speciﬁc
issues, which are the domain of the device vendor, and design
speciﬁc issues, being controlled by the used. The latter can be
addressed by the following faultmitigation schemes, depending on
the Design Assurance Level (DAL):
 Triple-PFGA redundancy with external voting circuits.
 Dual-FGPA redundancy.
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 Triple-modular redundancy (TMR) with voting circuits imple-
mented in the FPGA.
 Circuit redundancy with arbitration inside a single FPGA.
 Bitstream scrubbing with error correction.
 Periodic FPGA reconﬁguration.
3. Other types of circuits and industries
Complex electronic hardware, such as PLDs, FPGAs and ASICs,
are the critical components to be assessed against DO-254, which
has been recognized for safety-critical systems even before the
emergence of this standard (Hilton & Hall, 2000; Civera et al.,
2002). However, there are still other circuits used in safety-critical
applications that may also require assessment and certiﬁcation.
They are discussed brieﬂy in this section, along with the industries
that require such assessments.
Although the FAA (2005) states in its advisory circular that
there is no intention for commercial off-the-shelf processors to
comply with DO-254, Section 11.2 of DO-254 addresses the use of
such components in safety-critical avionics systems. In this view,
Fulton (2006) discusses the use of COTS graphical processors in
primary or secondary ﬂight displays, which are safety-critical. The
following requirements of DO-254 seem to be in place: manu-
facturer’s track record, quality control procedures, service experi-
ence, and component’s qualiﬁcation with respect to reliability.
With this inmind, a data package has been produced and the paper
provides information how eleven speciﬁc criteria have been met
for graphical processors.
Cole and Beeby (2004) present the entire DO-254 process for a
graphical processor, while two other papers (Knaus, 2004;
Quantum3D, 2007) discuss the role of certiﬁcation in graphical
systems using OpenGL standard. Very recently, Snyder (2008)
outlines the entire idea of diverging fromDO-254 by standardizing
software-based graphical processor units (GPU). He states,
referring to DO-254 scrutiny, that ‘‘This level of design assurance
is never available for a commercial GPU chip comprisingmillions of
gates.’’ In contrast, software-based GPU can be developed
according to a strict subset of a software standard, such as
OpenGL, and ‘‘can undergo standard design assurance using the
DO-178B software guidelines.’’
Several other electronic devices used in safety-critical systems
may have to be considered for certiﬁcation. For example, Forsberg
& Karlsson (2006) discuss the COTS CPU selection for safety-critical
applications, and Salewski and Taylor (2007) compare fault
handling in FPGAs and microcontrollers for such application.
General certiﬁcation criteria for databuses are discussed by Rierson
and Lewis (2003), and certiﬁcation issues for one speciﬁc databus,
AFDX, by Kornecki (2008).
Other industries made respective attempts as well, dated back
as far as 1994 (Hughes & Musgrave, 1994) for automotive
industries and the use of FPGAs. More recently, papers appeared
discussing certiﬁcation of electronic equipment for a gas burner
(Gonc¸alves et al., 2002), micro-electro-mechanical systems, MEMS
(White & Rios, 2002), and a radio altimeter (Hairion et al., 2007).
Lundteigen and Rausand (2006)made one of a few attempts to look
at hardware assessment for safety-critical systems from the
perspective different than that of DO-254, by applying the IEC
61508 and 61511 standards.
There have always been tendencies to bring together program-
ming languages and silicon, including implementations of a
language in silicon (Schoeberl, 2004, 2008) but also using a
programming language to design silicon and generate code for
programmable logic devices (Hilton & Hall, 2004). As one author
states it, ‘‘Software consists of bits downloaded into a prefabricated
hardware device. Traditional microprocessor software bits repre-
sent sequential instructions to be executed by a programmable
microprocessor. In contrast, ﬁeld-programmable gate array soft-
ware bits represent a circuit to be mapped onto an FPGAs
conﬁgurable logic fabric’’ (Vahid, 2007). Thus, it seems like the
‘‘bits’’ loaded into the microprocessor’s memory is as much
software as the ‘‘bits’’ loaded into an FPGA.
Finally, there is a vast amount of standards across various
industries that deal with software certiﬁcation, but not much with
hardware, with one exception. The international standard IEC
60601-1-4 (2000), on Programmable Electrical Medical Systems,
states explicitly that it ‘‘goes beyond traditional testing and
assessment of the ﬁnished medical electrical equipment and
includes requirements for the processes by which medical
electrical equipment is developed.’’ This is an important step in
the discussion on product versus process certiﬁcation, since the
standards further states: ‘‘Testing of the ﬁnished product is not, by
itself, adequate to address the safety of complex medical electrical
equipment.’’
The IEC standard takes as its basis the concepts of risk
management and a development life cycle, on which it builds
the procedures for design assurance. In particular, the guidance
addresses requirements speciﬁcation, architecture, detailed design
and implementation, modiﬁcation, and veriﬁcation and validation.
What seems to be a signiﬁcant shortcoming is that the document
redeﬁnes all basic concepts related to safety and system
development, making no reference to any of the computing or
engineering glossaries, where these terms have been previously
deﬁned. This fact makes the document look not very much related
to other existing standardization documents, even though the
deﬁnitions might be compatible with those previously formulated
in other standards.
4. Formal approaches to H/W veriﬁcation
A thorough reviewof literature for the last decade, or so, reveals a
number of attempts to formalize reasoning about hardware. Only a
handful of selected papers are analyzed below. An interested reader
canﬁndfurther references in twobookcollectionsonthe subject (Hu
& Martin, 2004; Bernardo & Cimatti, 2006). For a practical
implementation, one can lookat a recentpaper focusing onverifying
an IEEE-754 ﬂoating-point exponential function (Akbarpour et al.,
2009). For the purpose of this discussion, we follow the deﬁnition of
a formal method as given by the NASA Langley Formal Methods
Group (NASA Lagley Formal Methods Group, 2008) :
‘‘Formal Methods’’ refers to mathematically rigorous techni-
ques and tools for the speciﬁcation, design and veriﬁcation of
software and hardware systems. The phrase ‘‘mathematically
rigorous’’ means that the speciﬁcations used in formalmethods are
well-formed statements in a mathematical logic and that the
formal veriﬁcations are rigorous deductions in that logic (i.e., each
step follows from a rule of inference and hence can be checked by a
mechanical process.)
4.1. Historical perspective
In some of the earlier papers, Hoskote et al. (1997) addressed
the problem of verifying the correctness of gate-level implementa-
tions of large synchronous sequential circuits with respect to their
higher-level speciﬁcations in HDL. The veriﬁcation strategy is to
verify containment of the ﬁnite state machine (FSM) represented
by the HDL description in the gate-level FSM by computing pairs of
compatible states. Their formulation of the veriﬁcation problem
dissociates the veriﬁcation process from the speciﬁcation of initial
states, whose encoding may be unknown or obscured during
optimization and also enables veriﬁcation of reset circuitry.
Consequently, veriﬁcation of circuits with large and diverse I/O
sets, which was previously intractable due to lack of a single
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effective variable order for the binary decision diagrams is now
feasible.
In another older paper Kern and Greenstreet (1999) point out to
two main aspects of the application of formal methods in a
hardware design process: (a) the formal framework used to specify
desired properties of a design, and (b) the veriﬁcation techniques
and tools used to reason about the relationship between a
speciﬁcation and a corresponding implementation. They survey
a variety of frameworks and techniques proposed in the literature
and applied to actual designs. The speciﬁcation frameworks
include temporal logics, predicate logic, abstraction and reﬁne-
ment, as well as regular languages. The veriﬁcation techniques
presented include model checking, automata-theoretic techni-
ques, automated theorem proving, and approaches that integrate
the above methods. They present a selection of case studies where
formal methods were applied to industrial-scale designs, such as
microprocessors, ﬂoating-point hardware, protocols, memory
subsystems, and communications hardware.
O’Leary, Zhao,Gerth,&Seger (1999)gaveanaccountofapractical
exercise of formally verifying Intel processors. They have reported
on there principal lessons having been learned. First, they claim that
it has been feasible and practical to formally verify gate-level
descriptions of ﬂoating-point hardware in the timeframe of a major
processor design project. Secondly, they conﬁrmed that verifying
ﬂoating-point hardware against IEEE-level speciﬁcation required
signiﬁcant effort and investment in terms of two full-time formal
veriﬁcation experts over ﬁve quarters and a third full-time expert
added in the ﬁnal quarter. Finally, they report that devising and
executing ﬂoating-point formal veriﬁcation strategies required very
specialized expertise in ﬂoating-point architecture and algorithms.
Bunker, Gopalakrishnan, & McKee (2004) reviewed one aspect
of almost every hardware design, that is, protocol compliance
veriﬁcation. The paper presents a survey of candidate modeling
languages for protocol veriﬁcation, focusing on languages origin-
ally intended for hardware and software design and veriﬁcation
activities. The comparison is framed by ﬁrst constructing
taxonomy of these languages, and then by discussing the
applicability of each approach to the compliance veriﬁcation
problem. Each discussion includes a summary of the development
of the language, an evaluation of the language’s utility for the
problem domain, and examples of how the languagemight be used
to specify hardware protocols.
Only relatively recently authors of papers on formal methods
began considering tools supporting these approaches. A handful of
related papers are discussed below.
Turner & He (2001) investigate speciﬁcation, veriﬁcation and
test generation for synchronous and asynchronous circuits. Their
approach is called Digital Logic In LOTOS (the ISO language of
temporal ordering speciﬁcation), or DLIL for short. They deﬁned
relations for strong conformance to verify a design speciﬁcation
against a high-level speciﬁcation, and developed tools for
automated testing and veriﬁcation of conformance between an
implementation and its speciﬁcation.
Aljer & Devienne (2004) consider the use of a formal
speciﬁcation language as the foundation of real validation process.
They propose architecture based upon stepwise reﬁnement of a
formal model to achieve controllable implementation. Partition-
ing, fault tolerance, and systemmanagement are seen as particular
cases of reﬁnement in order to conceptualize systems correct by
proven construction. The basic principles of systemmethodologies
are presented and the methodology based on the reﬁnement
paradigm is described. In order to prove this approach, the B-HDL
tool based on a combination of VHDL and B method formal
language has been developed.
Nehme & Lundqvist (2003) describe a framework consisting of
both software tools for application veriﬁcation and hardware
platforms for execution and real-time monitoring. The tool
translates safety-critical VHDL code into a formal representation
in a form of FSM model. Different formal techniques can then be
applied on this representation in order to verify properties such as
liveness and deadlock and to validate that the timing constraints of
the original system hold. Three aspects of the tool implementation
are discussed: transformation of source code into an intermediate
representation, veriﬁcation of real-time properties, and some tool-
related implementation issues.
Dajani-Brown et al. (2004) focus on the use of SCADE (Safety-
Critical Application Development Environment) and its formal
veriﬁcation component, the Design Veriﬁer, to assess the design
correctness of a sensor voter algorithm used for management of
three redundant sensors. The algorithm, captured as a Simulink
diagram, takes input from three sensors and computes an output
signal and a hardware ﬂag indicating correctness of the output.
Since synthesis of a correct environment for analysis of the voter’s
normal and off-normal behavior is a key factor when applying
formal veriﬁcation tools, this paper is focused on: (1) the different
approaches used for modeling the voter’s environment; (2) the
strengths and shortcomings of such approaches when applied to
the discussed problem.
Hilton in his thesis (2004) proposes a process for developing a
system incorporating both software and PLD, suitable for safety-
critical systems of the highest levels of integrity. This process
incorporates the use of Synchronous Receptive Process Theory as a
semantic basis for specifying and proving properties of programs
executing on PLD, and extends the use of SPARK Ada to cover the
interface between software and programmable logic. The author
claims that the demonstrated methods are not only feasible but
also scale up to realistic system sizes, allowing development of
such safety-critical software–hardware systems to the levels
required by current safety standards.
4.2. Impact of DO-254 guidelines
Karlsson and Forsberg (2005) discuss the additional design
assurance strategies stated in DO-254, appendix B - ‘‘Design
assurance considerations for level A and level B functions.’’ In
particular, the use of formal speciﬁcation languages such as the
property speciﬁcation language (PSL) in combination with
dynamic (simulation) and static (formal) veriﬁcation methods
for programmed logic devices are addressed. Using these methods,
a design assurance strategy for complex programmable airborne
electronics compliant with the guidelines of DO-254 is suggested.
The proposed strategy is a semi-formal solution, a hybrid of static
and dynamic assertion based veriﬁcation. The functional speciﬁca-
tion can be used for both documentation of requirements and
veriﬁcation of the design’s compliance. It is possible to tightly
connect documents and reviews to present a complete and
consistent design/veriﬁcation ﬂow.
In a more current paper (Karlsson & Forsberg, 2008), the same
authors make an attempt to take a unifying approach to various
functional veriﬁcation strategies. Recognizing that the most
difﬁcult part of using effectively formal methods tools is writing
the formal properties and constraining the veriﬁcation effort, they
propose a careful planning and validation process based on the use
of UML, which use allows for graphical visualization of the design
intent. They propose assigning suitable veriﬁcation strategies to
the individual functional blocks in UML (such as a test plan, for
example), and then break them down into functional trees that
give more detailed understanding of the individual functions. They
combine this concept with their own approach to meet certiﬁca-
tion requirements, called Overlapped Layered Modular Methodol-
ogy (OLMM), involving the use of assertions for formal veriﬁcation
and simulation-based veriﬁcation.
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More recently, EDA vendors started recognizing the importance
of formal design veriﬁcations, and respective publications began to
appear at various venues. One such example, advocating usingmore
formal approaches for DO-254 compliance, is presented bySynopsys
(Marriott&Stone,2009).They includeanddiscussseveral interesting
observations, how DO-254 is relevant to design veriﬁcation from
their perspective. One of their thoughts is to look at ‘‘micro-coded
digital hardware’’ (in the language of DO-254) from the analog and
mixed-signal perspective, since ‘‘ultimately, all designs are essen-
tially analog implementations in physical transistors’’. Therefore, ‘‘it
is important that equivalent representations of circuit blocks yield
the same functional results regardless of their level of abstraction.’’
From the point of view of formal approaches, Marriot and Stone
claim that due to the complexity of all contemporary functional
designs, using a direct test approach is impractical, therefore a
constraint veriﬁcation approach should be used. The best way to
implement such approach is via inserting assertions in the design
and runningmany tests with different random seeds. Furthermore,
since for larger designs some assertions may become difﬁcult to
prove, and DO-254 requires demonstrating that gate-level netlists
are equivalent to the RTL implementation, a formal approach called
equivalence checking can be applied. This can be done either with
static veriﬁcation or through functional comparison of the design
against a reference view (such as RTL view).
Foster et al. (2009) give an interesting overview of the
prospective use of formal methods in DO-254 related programs.
After explaining the principal features and discussing the value of
formalmethods, they present a list of essential items, called formal
data checklist, which should be present for an effective use of a
formal method, including:
 Description of the formal methods approach.
 Formal statement of requirements (properties).
 Formal model (VHDL or any other design code).
 Proofs, results, traceability.
 Tools and assessment documentation.
 Counter-examples, new tests and properties in subsequent
iterations.
 Formal methods results at the conclusion.
Discussing further the primary uses of formal methods, where
to use them and where not, as well as outlining the common
misconceptions and objections to formal methods, the paper
presents recommendations on formal methods application:
 Allow applicants to use formal methods on DO-254 projects.
 Avoid tools that encourage a user to guide the tool towards proof.
 Before running model checking (for credit), clarify the applica-
bility of formal methods to speciﬁc properties.
 During model checking tool usage apply precautions (rerunning
it after design changes, choosing as few constraints as possible,
and choosing the ‘‘starting state’’)
 During certiﬁcation, use the formal veriﬁcation checklist
(presented above in this paper).
With the emergence of the FAA endorsed DO-254 document,
more papers began to appear that discuss not only also compliance
with the DO-254 standard but also tool support for formal
approaches. This is where some discussions of product or process
certiﬁcation and tool qualiﬁcation begin to take place. Related
papers are discussed in more detail in the next section.
5. Tool qualiﬁcation against DO-254
The increasing complexity of electronics hardware requires the
use of automatic software tools. The DO-254 document includes a
section on tool qualiﬁcation. Tool qualiﬁcation is the process
necessary to obtain certiﬁcation credit for use of a tool within the
context of a speciﬁc airborne system. The document distinguishes
between design tools, which can introduce errors into the product,
and veriﬁcation tools, which do not introduce errors into the
product but may fail detecting errors in the product. The DO-254
tool assessment and qualiﬁcation process is shown in Fig. 1.
Several vendors recently began dealing with tool qualiﬁcation.
Aldec (2007) used a sample design of a counter, with the following
features: one clock domain, asynchronous reset, clock enable port,
counting direction port (up/down), synchronous initial value
reload ability, 64 bits output data. The system contained two
boards connected throughDaughter Board (DB) connectors. First of
them – the main board – was Aldec HES board (HES3X3000EX)
connected to the PCI bus. This board generated stimuli for Design
Under Test (DUT) and collected results fromDUT. The second board
was a user DB with DUT.
Three independent stages of the veriﬁcation process include:
simulation, veriﬁcation, and comparison. During simulation, using
Active-HDL simulator, stimuli and results are captured in wave-
form on speciﬁed edge of user clock. The clock line of DUT is not
stored in waveform ﬁle. It is generated on HES main board during
veriﬁcation in order to assure constant frequency. The Proto-
typeVeriﬁcationTool (PVT) program is used for hardware veriﬁca-
tion, which sends test vectors to DUT and retrieves response data
from DUT. The two tasks: writing stimuli to SinFIFO and reading
results from RoutFIFO are the basis for the veriﬁcation process.
Results from RoutFIFO are written to a raw binary ﬁle, and then
transformed to a waveform. At the comparison stage, using Aldec
waveform viewer, the waveform captured during simulation is
compared with waveform from hardware veriﬁcation. No differ-
ences indicate that veriﬁcation has ﬁnished successfully.
For the tool qualiﬁcation, Aldec advocates in their process
named Compliance Tool Set (CTS, Aldec 2008) applying only the
ﬁrst three steps from Fig. 1. In step 1, ‘‘Identiﬁcation of the Tool’’,
caution is suggested, in case the tool version changes, all relevant
activities should be repeated (for example, HDL simulations re-
run). For step 2, ‘‘Identiﬁcation of the Process the Tool Support’’,
emphasis is placed on the need to include information about the
outputs produced by each tool. In step 3, answering the question
‘‘Is the Tool Output Independently Assessed’’, the following the
following methods of independently assessing the simulation tool
outputs are listed:
 Manual review (for smaller projects), comparing the expected
results with those actually produced by the simulator.
Fig. 1. Principle of the tool qualiﬁcation process (RTCA, 2000).
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 Use of another simulator, which is the case in CTS, which comes
with two HDL simulators, Active-HDL and Riviera-Pro, that can
be used for assessment of other vendors’ simulators outputs,
with a variety of hardware design languages.
 Comparing outputs of the assessed tool with another tool’s
outputs (as stated in DO-254), for example, verifying the
synthesis and place and route tools by comparing the outputs
of in-hardware testing to the outputs of post-synthesis and
timing level simulations.
Metastability occurs in digital circuits when the clock and data
inputs change values at approximately the same time, which leads
to ﬂip-ﬂop output oscillating, that is, going ‘‘metastable’’. Lange
(2008) addresses circuit metastability in the context of DO-254
tool certiﬁcation. Such situation may occur in designs with
multiple asynchronous clocks, when two or more discrete systems
communicate. Metastability is a severe problem in safety-critical
designs as may be the cause of intermittent failures. A
comprehensive veriﬁcation solution is offered by Mentor Graphics
0-In Clock Domain Crossing (CDC) tool that provides metastability
veriﬁcation solution:
 A structural analysis of the RTL code identiﬁes and analyzes all
signals crossing clock domains, and determines if their
synchronization schemes are present and correct.
 Simulation transfer protocols are monitored and veriﬁed to
assure that the synchronization schemes are used correctly.
 Global checks for re-convergence are performed, by injecting the
effects of potential metastability into the simulation environ-
ment and determining how the design will react.
The 0-In CDC tool provides added assurance that the design will
function correctly within the intended system. The independent
output assessment (see Fig. 1) is the suggested method of tool
assessment to verify the system clock domain crossings and
identify and eliminate instances of metastability.
Lange (2007) discusses another tool from Mentor Graphics,
ModelSim, which is considered a veriﬁcation tool, since it does not
generate the code to be used in the production circuit.ModelSim is
used for digital simulation of directed test cases and provides
coverage data. The paper outlines ten steps to follow the DO-254
assessment and qualiﬁcation process, as presented in Fig. 1. Tool
qualiﬁcation is bypassed by using an independent output
assessment (Step 3 in Fig. 1). For ModelSim it can be done by:
 Reviewing RTL simulation outputs for their match against
synthesized (gate-level) simulations; in case of match, the
likelihood of an error in ModelSim is extremely low.
 Applying selection of identical tests as done in simulation on the
physical device; if the results match, then one can logically
conclude that the tool, ModelSim, is correctly simulating the
model.
According to the author, the above two steps constitute
argument that the DO-254 tool assessment criteria are met.
The veriﬁcation steps/techniques must be performed in concert
with the RTL design, ultimately leading to automatic circuit
synthesis, which is the subject of another paper by Lange & Dewey
(2008). Since automatic synthesis and conversion to gate-level
designs is often done with optimizations by the hardware design
tools, it may be counterproductive in safety-critical designs, which
require strict adherence to the requirements. For this and other
reasons DO-254 has rather rigorous requirements on tool
qualiﬁcation, ‘‘to ensure that tool used to design and verify
hardware perform to an acceptable level on conﬁdence on the
target project.’’
The paper comments on three methods of DO-254 allowed tool
assessment: relevant history, independent output assessment, and
tool qualiﬁcation. Since proving relevant history and qualifying the
tool are both tedious processes, requiring the submittal of data,
which may not be easily available, the paper suggests that the way
to go is to demonstrate that ‘‘the hardware item must be
thoroughly veriﬁed against the functional requirements’’, thus,
the independent tool assessment is not necessary. In the opinion of
the authors of this review, this may not be the right thing to do,
since the tool output is still an abstract entity, not the hardware
item yet, and may contain errors that cannot be detected during
veriﬁcation.
In yet another paper from Mentor Graphics, Thatte and Lange
(2009) are focusing on FPGA synthesis tools. They look at the DO-
254 compliance related aspects beyond the traditional considera-
tions, such as design optimization, and make suggestions
regarding the following:
 Finite state machine (FSM) synthesis for single event upset
protection.
 Redundancy control for single-point failure avoidance.
 Managing late-state design changes, which may inadvertently
impact the product quality.
TNI (Baghai & Burgaud, 2006) presents a technical note how the
Reqtify tool complies with the DO-254 objectives. The tools
supports requirement traceability, impact analysis and automated
documentation generation. The functionality of Reqtify includes:
requirement coverage analysis, upstream and downstream impact
analysis, requirement change, update and deletion tracking
throughout the project life cycle, requirement attribute handling,
ﬁltering and display depending on these attributes, user conﬁg-
urable documentation generation, and regression analysis.
According to DO254 classiﬁcation, Reqtify is a veriﬁcation tool.
Prior to the use of the tool, a tool assessment should be performed.
The purpose of tool assessment and qualiﬁcation is to ensure that
the tool is capable of performing the particular activity to an
acceptable level of conﬁdence for which the tool will be used. It is
only necessary to assess those functions of the tool used for a
speciﬁc hardware life cycle activity, not the entire tool. The
assessment activity focuses as much or more on the application of
the tool as the tool itself. Veriﬁcation tool only needs to be qualiﬁed
if the function that it performs is not veriﬁed by another activity.
The ﬂow chart from DO-254 is applied and indicates the tool
assessment considerations and activities and provides guidance for
when tool qualiﬁcation may be necessary.
Dellacherie et al. (2003) describe a static formal approach that
could be used, in combination with requirements traceability
features, to apply formal methods in the design and veriﬁcation of
hardware controllers to support such protocols as ARINC 429,
ARINC 629, MIL-STD-1553B, etc. Their paper describes the
application of a formal tool, imPROVE-HDL, in the design and
veriﬁcation of airborne electronic hardware developed in a DO-254
context. imPROVE-HDL is a formal property checker that comple-
ments simulation in performing exhaustive debugging of VHDL/
Verilog RTL hardware models of complex avionics protocol
controllers without the need to create testbenches. Reqtify tool
is used to track the requirements throughout the veriﬁcation
process and to produce coverage reports. According to the authors,
using imPROVE-HDL coupled with Reqtify, avionics hardware
designers can assure that their bus controllers meet the most
stringent safety guidelines outlined in DO-254.
One additional issue is worthmentioning here, because it poses
certain challenges to DO-254 based tool qualiﬁcation. It is a
combined use of conventional software development tools, such as
MATLAB, with typical EDA tools, as described by Anderson
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(2009a,b). MATLAB, having abstractions such as complex numbers,
matrix operations, built-in libraries for DSP functions and wave-
form analysis, is a very desirable tool for DSP algorithm
development suitable for the FPGA implementation. This is a
quintessential problem, because FPGA designers normally have
limited knowledge of the application domain and those who
develop algorithms need not have signiﬁcant insight into FPGA
technology.
In addition, as Anderson points out, there exists a signiﬁcant
gap between these algorithmic abstractions and hardware, and the
question arises: can MATLAB be used to create executable
speciﬁcations for hardware? The author’s answer is positive,
provided appropriate veriﬁcation is done. The author then presents
a discussion of the use of Xilinx AccelDSP synthesis tool capable of
automatically generating a C/C++ model from a ﬂoating-point
MATLAB model, and provides a working example.
6. Tool questionnaire
A survey has been conducted to collect user feedback regarding
the use of programmable logic tools as applied to design and
veriﬁcation of complex electronic hardware according to the DO-
254 guidelines. The objective was to capture the experience and
collect opinions from industry and certiﬁcation authorities, related
to the assessment and qualiﬁcation of the tools.
The questionnaire has been developed and distributed at
several national and international conferences, including those
organized by the FAA over the last two years. In addition we
followed-up with a mailing to over 150 individuals engaged in
development of the aviation software and hardware. The ques-
tionnaire was also distributed internally in a few companies
engaged in the design of programmable logic devices, and has been
made available from the DO-254 Users Group website (http://
www.do-254.org/?p=tools). As a result of these activities a sample
of almost forty completely ﬁled responses was received. Even
though this may not be a sample fully statistically valid, the
collected results make for several interesting observations.
The majority of respondents represented avionics or engine
control developers (65%). Over 95% of respondents have technical
background (55% bachelor and 45%master degrees), with over 72%
having educational background in electronics. While 97% of
respondents have more than three years of experience, 59% have
more than 12 years. The most frequent respondents’ roles relevant
to the complex electronics tools include:
 Use of the tools for development or veriﬁcation of systems (60%).
 Managing and acting as company’s designated engineering
representative (26%).
 Development of components (12%).
 Development of the tools (2%).
The respondents’ primary interest was divided between
veriﬁcation (32%), development (27%), hardware (22%) and
concept/architecture (18%).
Considering criteria for the selection of tools for use in DO-254
projects (Table 1), as the most important have been reported the
following: the available documentation, ease of qualiﬁcation,
previous tool use, and host platform, followed by the quality of
support, tool functionality, tool vendor reputation, and the
previous use on airborne project. Selection of a tool for the project
is based either on a limited familiarization with the demo version
(50%) or an extensive review and test (40%). The prevailing
approach is to review and test the tool by training of the personnel
and by using a trial period on a smaller project.
From those who have actually experienced effort to qualify
programmable logic tools (only 14% of respondents, Fig. 2), the
quality of the guidelines is sufﬁcient or appropriate (62%, Fig. 3), so
is the ease of ﬁnding required information (67%), while the
increase of workload was deemed negligible or moderate (80%,
Fig. 4). An interesting observation concerns the scale of safety
improvement due to qualiﬁcation: marginal (43%), moderate
Fig. 4. Responses on workload increase due to tool qualiﬁcation.
Table 1
Importance of tool evaluation criteria (from highest to lowest).
Importance Criterion
1 Documentation quality
2 Ease of qualiﬁcation
3–4 Previous use on airborne products
Host platform
5 Quality of support
6 Reliability
7 Functionality
8–12 Tool performance
Internal evaluation
Previous familiarity with the tool
Availability of training
Compatibility with development platform
13 Vendor reputation
14 Compatibility with existing tools
15–17 Acquisition cost
Amount of training needed
Compatibility with selected PLDs
18 Other criteria
Fig. 2. Experience of respondents with tool qualiﬁcation.
Fig. 3. Distribution of responses on quality of tool guidelines.
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(21%), noticeable (7%) and signiﬁcant (29%)—see Fig. 5. Similarly,
the question about errors found in the tools may be a source for
concern: no errors (11%), few and minor errors (50%), signiﬁcant
and numerous (17%).
The respondents observed that the nature of tools is better
suited for rapid freeform development than for requirement-based
methodical design. Themajor issueswith tool use and qualiﬁcation
identiﬁed by the respondents in a comments section of the survey
included:
 ﬂawed simulation not accounting for hardware effects
 incorrect timing analysis
 lack of tool conformance to published IEEE standards
 marginal visibility and traceability of tool output
 hidden advanced tool features
 no access to proprietary tool design data
 no access to tool simulation and synthesis algorithms
 lack of detailed guidance on what is acceptable for qualiﬁcation
 lack of vendor independent standard test suite for tools
 frequent tool updates with marginal version control.
Despite all raised issues, the satisfaction level towards
programmable logic tools was high: more than 96% of respondents
marked their satisfaction level as 4 out of 5.
In summary, it is evident that software tools used in design and
veriﬁcation of complex electronics in safety-critical applications
should be scrutinized because of concerns that theymay introduce
design errors leading to potential safety violations and accidents.
However, the conducted survey indicated that the most important
criteria for tool selection are considered to be: available
documentation, ease of qualiﬁcation, and previous tool use, none
of which is technical. In this view, work should be done on
developing more objective criteria for tool qualiﬁcation and
conducting experiments with tools to identify their most vulner-
able functions thatmay be a source of subsequent design faults and
operational errors. Some of the authors speciﬁcally point out that the
lack of research investment in certiﬁcation technologieswill have a
signiﬁcant impact on levels of autonomous control approaches
that can be properly ﬂight certiﬁed, and could lead to limiting
capability for future autonomous systems.
The tool assessment process must follow the DO-254 guide-
lines, but the relative vagueness of these guidelines causes
signiﬁcant differences in interpretation by industry and should
be eliminated. Possibly, a common ground should be found
between DO-254 and DO-178B guidelines.
7. Summary and conclusion
The subject of DO-254 is electronic hardware. The software
veriﬁcation, software/hardware integration veriﬁcation, and
system integration veriﬁcation processes are not addressed in
DO-254. However, veriﬁcation of hardware requirements during
these processes is a valid method of hardware veriﬁcation (RTCA,
2000). Any complete airborne system must be certiﬁed. The
system deﬁnition and subsequent safety analysis determine
which part of the system functionality is allocated to hardware
and which part to software. Subsequently, the guidance of either
DO-178B or DO-254 needs to be applied. The software falls under
guidelines of DO-178B. However, addressing the hardware part is
not that simple.WehaveHDL code (that is, software) representing
the circuit with its interconnections, as well as software running
on aworkstationused to simulate the circuit behavior and analyze
its performance. The guidance of DO-254 does not address these
issues. The paper’s main point can be summarized that the use of
modern software-based tools, while designing electronic circuits,
effectively moves the point of emphasis from hardware to
software.
There is a signiﬁcant evidence of a widespread use of the FPGA
devices in safety-critical systems, developed with the aid of tools
we discuss in this paper. However, despite the fact that often
design and veriﬁcation can be done by the same individual, the
level of veriﬁcation may be insufﬁcient due to limited selection of
external stimuli, simulations may be skipped, and the design
approved by non-engineeringmanagers. Additionally, the research
shows that the quality of vendor-supplied soft core or macro
libraries is not guaranteed, while synthesis tools can generate
faults.
Considering the above, there is no surprise that vendorswant to
stay on the safe side. The excerpts from manufacturers’ product
descriptions are symptomatic. Despite great progress and
improved trustworthiness of new products, there is no certainty
that the product is perfect. This leads to the limited warranties and
legal disclaimers, such as the one below (NASA Ofﬁce of Logic
Design 2004):
IN NO EVENT SHALL <vendor> OR ITS LICENSORS OR THEIR
AGENTS BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL
OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES WHATSOEVER (INCLUDING, WITHOUT
LIMITATION, DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS, BUSINESS
INTERRUPTIONS, LOSS OF BUSINESS INFORMATION, OR OTHER
PECUNIARY LOSS) ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO
USE THE SOFTWARE, EVEN IF <vendor> AND/OR ITS LICENSORS
HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES
When designing circuits for implementation in programmable
logic, it is essential to use dedicated programs. A typical tool’s
functions would include software for initial design entry, logic
optimization, device ﬁtting, simulation, and conﬁguration. There
are tools speciﬁc to just one type of hardware such as analog
design, there are tools that serve multiple purposes, and there are
dedicated ASIC/FPGA tools. Tools common to analog and ﬁxed
digital systems are rather uncomplicated, with a thin layer of
abstraction between the users input and the tool’s output. A
designer can input the design, similar to CAD-like drawing, then
test and simulate it for minor post processing and simpliﬁcations.
ASIC/FPGA tools, by contrast, have a thick layer of abstraction
between the user’s input and the tool’s output. The designer
operating the tool commonly enters the design in a language such
as Verilog or VHDL. The tool then interprets the language,
synthesizes the logic, creates net lists, and interprets the net list
into a hardware speciﬁc layout. Synthesis involves typically the
optimization of logic, timing, and various other aspects. It can be
thought of as a black box, with design as an input and
‘‘synthesized’’ design as an output.
FPGA/CPLD vendors are primarily interested in developing
software required to take a design captured either in schematics or
HDL into a form that can be used to program a circuit. However,
because the Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tool industry is
fairly dynamic and hardware keeps evolving, the software
developers for back-end tools have to attend to two primary
activities, developing libraries for new EDA tools and simulators,
Fig. 5. Responses on safety improvement due to tool qualiﬁcation.
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while creating better ﬁtters and routers for new hardware with
more resources and more complex architectures.
Evolving interchange standards such as EDIF and Verilog/VHDL
help standardize interfaces to CAD tools and simulators. For
example, a CAD vendor can now provide an EDIF-compatible
library of design elements using Verilog or VHDL to implement the
models necessary for simulation environments. Recognizing that
there is a potentially large learning curve, FPGA/CPLD vendors are
also offering cost-effective entry-level design environments. The
CEH tool landscape is very diverse and not standardized. The
proprietary and closed nature of the tools makes them rather
difﬁcult to evaluate. Therefore, new evaluation criteria are needed
that would address technical aspects of tool use.
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